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INSURANCE - WHERE SPOUSE DELIBERATELY DAMAGES
JOINTLY OWNED PROPERTY, THE INNOCENT SPOUSE MAY
RECOVER UNDER A FIRE INSURANCE POLICY WHICH PROTECTS THE INTERESTS OF EACH SPOUSE. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. v. Molloy, 291 Md. 139, 433 A.2d 1135 (1981).
Charles and Diane Molloy owned a house, as tenants by the entirety, which was substantially damaged by fire on January 22, 1978. 1
The fire allegedly originated when an ember from Mr. Molloy's cigarette fell onto a pile of clothing on the floor of a closet. 2 Mr. Molloy
fell asleep shortly thereafter and awoke to a house full of smoke. Due
to heavy smoke he was unable to reach the phone in the kitchen. He
left the house, driving a distance of four and one half miles past neighbors' houses and several business establishments to a restaurant where
he stopped and notified the fire department. 3 Sometime later he returned home finding the fire extinguished. When approached by a
county fire inspector, Mr. Molloy fled. 4 On his return he was approached by a police officer. Again he fled, but was subsequently apprehended. A charge of arson was nolprossed by the state's attorney.5
The Molloys filed a claim against St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company. St. Paul denied liability based on Mr. Molloy's actions
during and immediately after the fire. 6 The Molloys filed suit and were
1. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 291 Md. 139, 140,433 A.2d 1135, 1136

(1981).
2. Id at 141,433 A.2d at 1136.
3. Brieffor Appellee at 3-4, St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 291 Md. 139,
433 A.2d 1135 (1981). Mr. Molloy glanced across the street as he backed his car
out of the driveway. When he failed to see his neighbor's car he looked to his
next-door neighbors. As a result of family disputes the Molloys were not on
speaking terms with their next-door neighbors. Molloy drove off intending to stop
at the grocery store around the comer but he discovered that he did not have any
change for the telephone. Driving at 70-80 miles per hour Molloy headed toward
a McDonald's Restaurant where he thought he would be allowed to use the
phone. He passed numerous business establishments including a Seven-Eleven
Store because the parking lots were congested. Id
4. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 291 Md. 139, 142,433 A.2d 1135, 1137
(1981). Molloy claimed he drove away because he was jealous when he saw his
wife in front of their home with a man who was a family friend. Id
5. Brief for Appellant at 3, St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 291 Md. 139,
433 A.2d 1135 (1981). Based on an investigation by the Prince George's County
Fire Marshall a charge of arson was filed against Charles Molloy. Id
6. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 291 Md. 139, 143,433 A.2d 1135, 1137
(1981). The insurance company wrote the Molloys a letter which denied liability.
They informed the insureds that the company was
not liable for this loss of January 22, 1978, by reason of the neglect of the
insured to use all reasonable means to save and preserve the property at
and after the loss. (See lines II through 22 of the 165 line Standard Fire
Policy). The insurance company, of course, reserves its rights to invoke
any other terms, conditions, or exclusions of the policy which may be
applicable to this loss upon facts not known or which may later be
discovered.
Id
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awarded $87,614.28. St. Paul appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the circuit court's decision. 8 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari and held that an insurer's defense of neglect encompasses the defense of arson and that
where the insurance policy designates husband and wife as "named insured," the policy covers each named insured's interest separately.9
Courts in many jurisdictions have had occasion to decide whether
a co-owner of property may recover under an insurance policy where
another co-owner has violated policy provisions against deliberate
burning.1O The majority of courts follow the traditional view that property law should be applied to issues of this nature I I whereby the fraud
of one co-owner voids the policy as to the other, 12 because jointly held
property creates joint obligations. This viewpoint has been criticized
for ignoring fundamental rules of contract interpretatioq.. 13
The modem view, adopted by courts in several jurisdictions, holds
that the nature of property ownership is irrelevant. 14 The insurance
contract is personal in nature and disputes should be settled with reference to the traditional rules of contract interpretation and with emphasis on the intent of the parties. 15 Where ambiguities exist the trier of
fact is given the opportunity to decide questions. of interpretation. 16
Courts which adopt the modem view consistently hold that where
there are joint interests in an insurance policy, each insured should be
allowed to recover up to the limit of his or her individual interest. 17
There are two lines of reasoning upon which courts rely when holding
that interests are several rather than joint. Where property was held
7. Id at 144,433 A.2d at 1137. At the close of evidence the trial judge instructed the
jury that the defense of arson had been waived and that they were to treat Mr. and
Mrs. Molloy's interest in their property separately.
8. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 46 Md. App. 570, 420 A.2d 994 (1980),
rev'd, 291 Md. 139, 433 A.2d 1135 (1981).
9. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 291 Md. 139, 144,433 A.2d 1135, 1137
(1981).
10. Mercantile Trust Co. v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 376 F.2d 502 (7th Cir.
1967); Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 384 A.2d 398 (Del. 1978); Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329 (Me. 1978); Hoyt v. New
Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.H. 242, 29 A.2d 121 (1942); Howell v. Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co., 130 N.J. Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (1974); Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Hummel, 219 Va. 803, 250 S.E.2d 774 (1979); Klemens v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 8
Wis. 2d 565, 99 N.W.2d 865 (1959).
11. Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 384 A.2d 398, 399 (Del. 1978).
12. See Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 450, 451-52 (1969).
13. See Comment, Spouse's Fraud As Bar 10 Insurance Recovery, 21 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 543-55 (1979).
14. See Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 450,453-55 (1969).
15. See, e.g., Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 384 A.2d 398, 400-01 (Del.
1978).
16. Bond v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut., 289 Md. 379, 384, 424 A.2d 765, 768 (1981).
17. Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 384 A.2d 398, 398-402 (Del. 1978);
Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329,331-32 (Me. 1978); Hoyt
v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.H. 242, 243, 29 A.2d 121, 122 (1942).
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jointly the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reasoned that simple
contract interpretation should allow each insured to receive the benefit
of his or her bargain. 18 Other courts have applied the rationale of public policy to reach the same result. 19 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine held in favor of an innocent co-insured by noting that there is
no public policy against allowing an insured indemnity where a coinsured has violated the policy without the other insured's direction or
participation. 20
Prior to St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Molloy, 21 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland touched upon this issue when it decided
a case involving a mortgagor and mortgagee. 22 The court, finding separate interests to justify payment to the innocent mortgagee, held that
neither insured can be affected by the independent fraud of the other?3
In St. Paul, the court of appeals addressed two issues. The first
concerned the matter of St. Paul's denial of liability based on non-preservation of the property.24 The court had previously held that insurance companies may waive defenses and such waivers may be either
expressed or implied. 25 While St. Paul failed to mention arson as a
defense in its letter to the Molloys, the court, nevertheless, found that
the arson defense was implied in the general denial based on non-preservation. 26 Therefore, there was no waiver since intentional destruction
of property in any situation would be seen as a form of nonpreservation. 27
The second issue raised, one of first impression in Maryland, was
whether a person who holds property jointly can be barred from recovering under a fire insurance policy where the co-insured is suspected of
fraud. Essentially, the issue was whether the interests of the insureds in
the policy were joint or several. Analyzing both the traditional and the
modem approaches, the Maryland court adopted the latter, citing
traditional rules of contract interpretation as the basis for deciding such
issues. 28 Discussing the nature of the property ownership is unnecessary, according to the court, because the issue lies in the insurance contract, not in the property owned. A reasonable interpretation of the
contract, giving the insured the benefit of any ambiguity, protects the
insured's interest in the policy. Thus, the court concluded that the responsibility for fraud in the Molloys' insurance contract being separate,
18. Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.H. 242, 243, 29 A.2d 121, 122 (1942).
19. Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 384 A.2d 398, 398-402 (Del. 1978);
Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329, 331-32 (Me. 1978).
20. Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329, 331-32 (Me. 1978).
21. 291 Md. 139, 433 A.2d 1135 (1981).
22. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 158 Md. 169, 148 A. 252 (1930).
23. Id at 182, 148 A. at 257.
24. 291 Md. 139, 144-46, 433 A.2d 1135, 1138-39 (1981).
25. Rubenstein v. Jefferson Nat'l Life, 268 Md. 388, 392, 302 A.2d 49, 52 (1973).
26. 291 Md. 139, 146, 433 A.2d 1135, 1138 (1981).
27. Id at 146, 433 A.2d at 1139.
28. Id at 151-53,433 A.2d at 1141-42.
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the husband's liability may not be imputed to the wife. 29
By adopting the modern view, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
has joined a growing minority of jurisdictions which recognize that
cases of this nature present issues of contract interpretation and not
issues of strict property law. 30 The result of this holding is that the
insurance policy is seen as a purely personal contract between the insurance company and the policyholder. 31
Following this decision, Maryland courts will apply traditional
rules of contract interpretation in settling disputes between insureds
and insurance companies. By giving the parties the benefit of their intentions it places co-insureds and insurance companies on a more equal
and independent footing. The decision prevents an artificial suretyship
from being created or implied by not allowing one co-insured's interest
to be affected by the acts or omissions of another insured as long as the
insurance contract does not specifically state that the interests are
joint.32 Fairness and equity are also served by the court's holding. It
would be unfair to hold an innocent party liable for the wrongs of a coowner. Subsequent cases should be decided through an analysis of the
policy language to determine whether obligations and responsibilities
are joint or several.
Mark G. Levin

29. Id. at 153, 433 A.2d at 1142.
30. See, e.g., Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 411 Mich. 267, 307 N.W.2d 53 (1981).
This is a decision on similar facts where the court approached the issue from a
strict contract interpretation viewpoint.
31. See 12 J. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7006, at 68 (1981).
32. Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 411 Mich. 267, 269, 307 N.W.2d 53, 55 (1981).

